It's my long standing opinion[1] that we shouldn't accept any RAM that can be subject to random bit flips. Most of the mitigations are just security through obscurity.
My computer with a lot of ECC DDR5 sometimes catches several bitflips in a day. I know this because they are reported to dmesg and sometimes I look at dmesg.
Intel decided long ago that you would need to pay more to not be subject to random bitflips. So it's an AMD system.
Intel MEE addressed this (https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/204.pdf), by treating DRAM as entirely untrusted (assuming an attacker with arbitrary physical read/write capabilities), but then they discontinued it.
Regarding your linked comment:
> If we had properly tested and validated RAM, RowHammer wouldn't work, ever.
While it's exacerbated by physical defects and tight timings, it's really a fundamental problem with how DRAM works. It's frankly a miracle it works in the first place.
No. If it was designed really well, it would trigger extra refreshes as needed. It would know how much accessing a row disturbs nearby rows and how much disturbance a row can suffer before it needs a refresh to prevent data corruption. It would know how long a row can be held open for, too. There is no fundamental theorem that rowhammer must work. It was an engineering tradeoff.
I don't think we can blame DRAM designers for flying a teensy bit too close to the sun here, since this is no problem in normal operation and only appears under adversarial scenarios. We can blame them for not fixing it once it was discovered. And we can definitely blame Intel for making ECC RAM a market segmentation feature.
Where did I imply that they should use an incorrect underestimation of row disturbance? If they actually measured these things, they'd know how far away a disturbance can be created before it becomes so weak the normal refresh cycle fixes it.
Okay then refresh the whole thing and not just a single row whenever TRR is triggered.
Or refresh the whole thing after a certain number of row activations.
Or interleave activations with refreshes. Say, after every 5 activations, refresh the next row in the refresh cycle.
I'm not a DRAM expert. They can figure it out. I promise if you refresh the whole chip after every row activation you won't have rowhammer. It'll be too slow though. Somewhere in between is the fastest point where there isn't rowhammer.
It's my long standing opinion[1] that we shouldn't accept any RAM that can be subject to random bit flips. Most of the mitigations are just security through obscurity.
[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33860477
My computer with a lot of ECC DDR5 sometimes catches several bitflips in a day. I know this because they are reported to dmesg and sometimes I look at dmesg.
Intel decided long ago that you would need to pay more to not be subject to random bitflips. So it's an AMD system.
I was shocked to learn that around 10% of Firefox crashes are caused by bit flips.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47252971
Most software is like this. Factorio had a weird one where some routers dropped UDP packets with zero checksum.
Intel MEE addressed this (https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/204.pdf), by treating DRAM as entirely untrusted (assuming an attacker with arbitrary physical read/write capabilities), but then they discontinued it.
Regarding your linked comment:
> If we had properly tested and validated RAM, RowHammer wouldn't work, ever.
While it's exacerbated by physical defects and tight timings, it's really a fundamental problem with how DRAM works. It's frankly a miracle it works in the first place.
No. If it was designed really well, it would trigger extra refreshes as needed. It would know how much accessing a row disturbs nearby rows and how much disturbance a row can suffer before it needs a refresh to prevent data corruption. It would know how long a row can be held open for, too. There is no fundamental theorem that rowhammer must work. It was an engineering tradeoff.
I don't think we can blame DRAM designers for flying a teensy bit too close to the sun here, since this is no problem in normal operation and only appears under adversarial scenarios. We can blame them for not fixing it once it was discovered. And we can definitely blame Intel for making ECC RAM a market segmentation feature.
What you describe is the Target Row Refresh (TRR) mitigation, and it can be bypassed via "half-double" attack.
Where did I imply that they should use an incorrect underestimation of row disturbance? If they actually measured these things, they'd know how far away a disturbance can be created before it becomes so weak the normal refresh cycle fixes it.
It is not feasible for DRAM (or the memory controller) to maintain a fully accurate simulation of DRAM. If it was easy they'd have done it.
[delayed]
Okay then refresh the whole thing and not just a single row whenever TRR is triggered.
Or refresh the whole thing after a certain number of row activations.
Or interleave activations with refreshes. Say, after every 5 activations, refresh the next row in the refresh cycle.
I'm not a DRAM expert. They can figure it out. I promise if you refresh the whole chip after every row activation you won't have rowhammer. It'll be too slow though. Somewhere in between is the fastest point where there isn't rowhammer.
It doesn't need to be a fully accurate simulation, any more than your car needs a fully accurate ICE simulation to decide "Change the engine oil".
Just count accesses to each row, and refresh the adjacent row(s) when some limit is reached.