For those who missed it, unrelated to this specific ZKP thing the release cycle also now permits Android tablets without a SIM to be first-class adjunct devices without using wierd tricks or alternate clients. It may permit them to be the initiation/sign-on device, which would invoke the ZKP, but the point for me as an existing phone number denominated user, the point is I can be on my tablet with true signal now. Nothing against molly, wanted it in the base.
For the longest time, you couldn't. It wasn't until this release I realised that had changed. If it changed before, it wasn't well communicated to me as an Android signal user. I was on beeper and then molly precisely because there was so little traction on changing this. You could install signal fine, but you couldn't QR code or secret phrase mesh it with your android handset. Oddly, iPad meshed fine with iPhone or Android, and OSX desktop likewise. Just Android tablet which didn't.
Do you think this changed in over 18 months? I think it changed in under 18 months.
Signal needs to release all the infra automation code behind their backend. How they setup and manage it all should not be secret. It also makes it easy to rebuild if for some reason they are compromised. They've ghosted multiple people about this question. There's no reason a 501(c)(3) shouldn't release it.
Non profit doesn't necessitate open sourcing their whole product. If you don't like that, don't donate. As long as they are transparent about their decisions that is the only obligation they have.
Perhaps it shouldn't necessitate it, but I can't think of a good reason why not.
If it were expensive to release it, that would be a reason. But it costs roughly zero dollars to create a public repo on GitHub and a cron job to push to it once a day.
Making the system public potentially increases the likelihood of a hack, which would be bad for Signal users. But relying on this argument to keep the source secret is, I think, a confession that your security is below par. Or to put it the other way round: A secure software system remains secure even if its source code is public, so making your source public is a strong signal that you are confident in your security measures. Security isn't something I expect all non-profits to focus on, but I think it would be telling for Signal to hide behind this reason.
Nobody uses that and I think it was pre-mined. They should have implemented Monero but the UX isn't there. Maybe a Monero light wallet server run by Signal.
They probably avoided Monero to not attract the additional scrutiny. They don't even accept donations in Monero.
Claims without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
Signal is not robust for metadata protection. Neither do they advertise anonymity. They take steps to protect metadata but it's nothing compared to SimpleX.
If it's "the feds", then how? There's reproducible builds on all platforms except iOS so we know the source code is what's running on our devices. Can you point to the code where the E2EE is compromised?
They are the largest messenger that has E2EE backups by default.
True, if they're not even going to allow that for payment then they might as well remove it from the app altogether. Because what's the point if they don't even believe in it themselves.
The most ubiquitous, absolutely. Their data collection is unparalleled. They're on almost every website, app, they have fingers into payment and browsers and mobile OSes.
In terms of what they do with big data there's more evil parties like Palantir but data abuse starts with collecting it, and I would object to it even if Google promised to only use it for good. For me my privacy is already violated when my data is collected, not just when it's abused. And I do consider Google's use of that data abusive, just not in the worst ways.
Why? Just raise the prices if they get more spam on non-google payments.
I've literally registered a Signal account on one of the free SMS sites floating around. Why would spammers choose the payment route over phone numbers? They would just choose the one that's cheaper.
googles obligation to hand out all account linked info notwithstanding, one may still create google accounts without associating a phone number, by doing so on old android versions. signal does however explicitly force credit card info here, thus providing direct individual traceability ..
usually, the implication of ZKP is that you buy coupons and claim them without attribution. in this coupon scenario the ZKP can just be a blind signature scheme.
however signal has an obscene fondness for TEEs (secure enclaves) so they may actually be doing something stupid here which will require trust beyond the ZKP.
I'm curious about the cost because you can buy a phone number for Signal for ~10 cents (spammers likely get them cheaper). I would still buy it because you don't have to worry about losing your number or something.
I know for a fact If you use "signal" matrix or whatever "security" app, you will get branded a terrorist in India, your life will be upended and you will face a long list of problems.
Yes that's bad but that's an Indian government problem, not a signal or other messenger app problem. And really, it sounds like there was a lot more going on with these people than just using a particular app. Discord and WhatsApp are mentioned too.
India also bans most satellite phones by the way. I have one so I looked into that as to not get caught out travelling.
The big deal is, having talked to security people, they are "fine" with WhatsApp because the theory is, they get data from whatsapp so they have some sort of backdoor access.
They are pretty chill with WhatsApp which id unexplainable
I don't trust Signal. The device OSes and hardware are opaque, chatty, not private or trustworthy, the network backbone is completely owned by dragnet surveillance, Dual_EC_DRBG flavored shenanigans, so how could an app running on top of this suddenly be trustworthy? Especially one that's super high profile which signals inside a dragnet "someone is working especially hard to make this secret".
Viewing any security thing as a binary is the wrong way to look at it. Figure out your adversaries, how much power they have and what they are willing to spend. Make your decisions from there.
I personally think signal is sufficient for the threats the average person is concerned about, but that is a decision each individual has to make for themselves.
Is it your expectation that E2E is broken by these "dragnet surveillance" networks? Surely not?
I concede that if you can't trust the device itself you can't trust anything running on it, but why have you resigned yourself to that? And how does that reflect on signal at all?
> Is it your expectation that E2E is broken by these "dragnet surveillance" networks? Surely not?
While I disagree with these critiques of Signal, the surveillance networks can capture metadata - who talks to who and when - without breaking E2E. The metadata is as valuable as the data.
I think Signal has a feature to protect users, but I can't imagine how it works if the attacker can see all parties' Internet connections.
It's true someone snooping at either end of a conversation could over time correlate timing and sizes to show that two users are communicating, but that's the most they can do. Signal is not peer to peer so you're not connecting to your recipient, and signal itself has enough raw volume that simply correlating sizes and timing of a small number of messages wouldn't really be sufficient to know who is communicating with who.
I think they could make that significantly more difficult by adding csprng delays and padding to the messages. That way you can't really effectively correlate timing and sizes without direct access to signals inner workings. I'm not sure what signal's actual throughput is, but if think as a paid feature it could be economical.
Another crazier way would be to send every message to a large number random latched recipients. Good way to 1000x your bandwidth.
> The metadata is as valuable as the data.
This can be true if you are able to get ahold of a user's device and access their signal messages. It's not true in most other cases. I don't particularly care if you know that I am talking to someone specific as much as I care that you don't know what I'm saying.
> the surveillance networks can capture metadata - who talks to who and when
If this is part of your threat model then I would suggest a different tool such as SimpleX since it uses onion routing and can be configured to always use private routing/relays.
Molly is a security-hardened Signal client only on Android for people unfamiliar. They went through a period of not updating (there were no security updates during that time afaict), but now releases should happen faster on top of Signal.
In Molly there's three options. Google Play Services, WebSocket, and UnifiedPush.
I use the WebSocket and Molly has used >1% of battery since the last full charge so it doesn't seem like play services would improve battery but maybe if I had more apps depending on it..
Google and Apple can't see the notification content but they can see metadata. If you want metadata privacy you should use SimpleX instead anyway.
If you're using WebSocket, how do Google and Apple see metadata? Can someone explain why it's so difficult to make a decent chat app divorced from their ecosystems?
I was using Silence from F-Droid for a while back in the day because of these issues, but the lack of interop and needing to make everyone move again soured me on the whole thing. I would rather just get people on XMPP or Matrix and not use some sketchy phone-first app at all. For SMS I use Fossify Messages, which I think was a fork of QKSMS. I don't use SMS as primary or sensitive comms, only as needed. Same as email, basically, but less useful.
I really liked silence. I stopped using it when f-droid said the source code was no longer available. Fossify messages is the best replacement I've found.
(I dont bother with encrypted messenging apps. I prefer to assume that anything I do on my phone is doubleplus unprivate. If I want privacy, I head over to my computer.)
The problem for me is writing on a mobile device is a terrible user experience.
When I'm at home I don't wanna use a virtual keyboard on a 6.3" (or 7.9 unfolded). I just want to use my triple monitor PC setup with a real keyboard and a wealth of display space.
Mobile is cool for on the go but a productivity killer.
That's not based in reality. Why would Google have a hardware backdoor when 99.9% of their users run their software giving them the data they want.
Google Pixels have no evidence of a hardware backdoor when a desktop is proven to be much less secure against remote and local exploitation.
It has been shown through leaks that Pixels running GrapheneOS are the most secure against Cellebrite in AFU. GrapheneOS was the first to implement a reboot timer feature which brings the device to BFU (much more secure) and then Android and iOS copied it (with longer, non-customizable duration).
You can inspect network traffic to see that GrapheneOS phones only connect to GrapheneOS-run services.
But GrapheneOS relies on a proprietary, black-box security chip from Google... who pinky-promised to open-source it but never did, and that just doesn't sit well with me.
I think it's entirely possible that a compromised Titan module (whether such code ships with the device or is updated at a later point) could leak keys via some covert method, and possibly transmit via the baseband or through some other application/method where the OS is not really aware of what's going on.
I tried it and it was fine while it worked, but eventually I had to go back to regular Signal because Molly's updates did not follow Signal's closely enough, and at some point the server code changed enough to where I was unable to use it for an unacceptable amount of time (after checking, it took them weeks to update). Something to keep in mind if you're not using a custom server.
For those who missed it, unrelated to this specific ZKP thing the release cycle also now permits Android tablets without a SIM to be first-class adjunct devices without using wierd tricks or alternate clients. It may permit them to be the initiation/sign-on device, which would invoke the ZKP, but the point for me as an existing phone number denominated user, the point is I can be on my tablet with true signal now. Nothing against molly, wanted it in the base.
Here's an article saying that: https://aboutsignal.com/news/signal-allows-android-phones-to...
You can already do that without being a trusted device.
For the longest time, you couldn't. It wasn't until this release I realised that had changed. If it changed before, it wasn't well communicated to me as an Android signal user. I was on beeper and then molly precisely because there was so little traction on changing this. You could install signal fine, but you couldn't QR code or secret phrase mesh it with your android handset. Oddly, iPad meshed fine with iPhone or Android, and OSX desktop likewise. Just Android tablet which didn't.
Do you think this changed in over 18 months? I think it changed in under 18 months.
Signal needs to release all the infra automation code behind their backend. How they setup and manage it all should not be secret. It also makes it easy to rebuild if for some reason they are compromised. They've ghosted multiple people about this question. There's no reason a 501(c)(3) shouldn't release it.
I’m not sure their tax status is the justification your argument needs.
OpenAI is 501c3, should they also be required to release everything?
Yes
Non profit doesn't necessitate open sourcing their whole product. If you don't like that, don't donate. As long as they are transparent about their decisions that is the only obligation they have.
Perhaps it shouldn't necessitate it, but I can't think of a good reason why not.
If it were expensive to release it, that would be a reason. But it costs roughly zero dollars to create a public repo on GitHub and a cron job to push to it once a day.
Making the system public potentially increases the likelihood of a hack, which would be bad for Signal users. But relying on this argument to keep the source secret is, I think, a confession that your security is below par. Or to put it the other way round: A secure software system remains secure even if its source code is public, so making your source public is a strong signal that you are confident in your security measures. Security isn't something I expect all non-profits to focus on, but I think it would be telling for Signal to hide behind this reason.
What other reasons are there?
"open" is literally in the name, so yes
Apple should make their products edible as well.
Pretty sure that was Blackberry's downfall
Per the commits, this will require a purchase with Google Play Billing to mitigate spam while keeping the SMS verification option.
It says something about Play Billing being used specifically to mitigate spam?
I understand using play payments initially but hopefully eventually there's a way to buy an account without going through google.
Add ability to pay for a signal login.
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/commit/7da3357b5...
Wouldn't that be related to data storage? Which they offer now? Or is that different?
Ah, I thought you meant using google play to do the payments to prevent spam unrelated to the cost. I know they are costing something.
What about their built-in cryptocurrency? It's a perfect use for it. They could require payment post-install yet before message can be sent.
Nobody uses that and I think it was pre-mined. They should have implemented Monero but the UX isn't there. Maybe a Monero light wallet server run by Signal.
They probably avoided Monero to not attract the additional scrutiny. They don't even accept donations in Monero.
I always thought they didn't want monero because they were pushing their own crypto thingy. Which indeed nobody uses.
They avoid Monero because Signal and the EFF are actually the feds and this is all theater.
Claims without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
Signal is not robust for metadata protection. Neither do they advertise anonymity. They take steps to protect metadata but it's nothing compared to SimpleX.
If it's "the feds", then how? There's reproducible builds on all platforms except iOS so we know the source code is what's running on our devices. Can you point to the code where the E2EE is compromised?
They are the largest messenger that has E2EE backups by default.
True, if they're not even going to allow that for payment then they might as well remove it from the app altogether. Because what's the point if they don't even believe in it themselves.
I've literally never seen anybody mention it, much less use it since it was announced.
Ugh wtf so I need a Google account on Android? That's not going to happen.
For an org that pretends to care about privacy you'd imagine there'd be a way to avoid, you know, the biggest privacy invader on the planet.
Just allow monero payments or something. Alongside Google play for the sheep that want to use that.
Are you being hyperbolic, or do you really consider Google the worst with regards to privacy.
The most ubiquitous, absolutely. Their data collection is unparalleled. They're on almost every website, app, they have fingers into payment and browsers and mobile OSes.
In terms of what they do with big data there's more evil parties like Palantir but data abuse starts with collecting it, and I would object to it even if Google promised to only use it for good. For me my privacy is already violated when my data is collected, not just when it's abused. And I do consider Google's use of that data abusive, just not in the worst ways.
Hopefully they eventually make a way to pay without it.
You wouldn't believe the spam if they did that
Why? Just raise the prices if they get more spam on non-google payments.
I've literally registered a Signal account on one of the free SMS sites floating around. Why would spammers choose the payment route over phone numbers? They would just choose the one that's cheaper.
googles obligation to hand out all account linked info notwithstanding, one may still create google accounts without associating a phone number, by doing so on old android versions. signal does however explicitly force credit card info here, thus providing direct individual traceability ..
Plus they are mandating you give your details to Google. So much for privacy
you can't wave your hands, say "zero knowledge", and be private. this is too little information to be useful
usually, the implication of ZKP is that you buy coupons and claim them without attribution. in this coupon scenario the ZKP can just be a blind signature scheme.
however signal has an obscene fondness for TEEs (secure enclaves) so they may actually be doing something stupid here which will require trust beyond the ZKP.
any link to presentations/papers on this?
I'm interested on learning ZKPs -- they seem so much like "fairy-tale come true" because I don't know much
nym.com might have some. They use stuff like that heavily and there's a bunch of academics involved.
Also ZCash.
Lots of discussion at that link, but what's the bottom line? Can you register without a phone number yet?
Likely soon.
I'm curious about the cost because you can buy a phone number for Signal for ~10 cents (spammers likely get them cheaper). I would still buy it because you don't have to worry about losing your number or something.
The commit history is kinda wild
I know for a fact If you use "signal" matrix or whatever "security" app, you will get branded a terrorist in India, your life will be upended and you will face a long list of problems.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ats-probes-use-of-...
https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/accused-da...
https://www.deccanherald.com/india/secure-messaging-apps-lik...
https://india-employmentnews.com/tech-category/delhi-blast-n...
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech-news/Dangerous-Sign...
And it doesn't matter you use a connected phone or not, they just get data from ISPs.
And yes, using a VPN will get you knocked up as well.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/12/indias-vpn-ban-in-k...
Yes that's bad but that's an Indian government problem, not a signal or other messenger app problem. And really, it sounds like there was a lot more going on with these people than just using a particular app. Discord and WhatsApp are mentioned too.
India also bans most satellite phones by the way. I have one so I looked into that as to not get caught out travelling.
And WhatsApp is E2EE with the same protocol so I don't see the big deal.
The big deal is, having talked to security people, they are "fine" with WhatsApp because the theory is, they get data from whatsapp so they have some sort of backdoor access. They are pretty chill with WhatsApp which id unexplainable
[delayed]
What if I use a VPN as a dude? Still gonna get knocked up?
You will be if you drop the soap after you get arrested :)
I don't trust Signal. The device OSes and hardware are opaque, chatty, not private or trustworthy, the network backbone is completely owned by dragnet surveillance, Dual_EC_DRBG flavored shenanigans, so how could an app running on top of this suddenly be trustworthy? Especially one that's super high profile which signals inside a dragnet "someone is working especially hard to make this secret".
Viewing any security thing as a binary is the wrong way to look at it. Figure out your adversaries, how much power they have and what they are willing to spend. Make your decisions from there.
I personally think signal is sufficient for the threats the average person is concerned about, but that is a decision each individual has to make for themselves.
Is it your expectation that E2E is broken by these "dragnet surveillance" networks? Surely not?
I concede that if you can't trust the device itself you can't trust anything running on it, but why have you resigned yourself to that? And how does that reflect on signal at all?
> Is it your expectation that E2E is broken by these "dragnet surveillance" networks? Surely not?
While I disagree with these critiques of Signal, the surveillance networks can capture metadata - who talks to who and when - without breaking E2E. The metadata is as valuable as the data.
I think Signal has a feature to protect users, but I can't imagine how it works if the attacker can see all parties' Internet connections.
It's true someone snooping at either end of a conversation could over time correlate timing and sizes to show that two users are communicating, but that's the most they can do. Signal is not peer to peer so you're not connecting to your recipient, and signal itself has enough raw volume that simply correlating sizes and timing of a small number of messages wouldn't really be sufficient to know who is communicating with who.
I think they could make that significantly more difficult by adding csprng delays and padding to the messages. That way you can't really effectively correlate timing and sizes without direct access to signals inner workings. I'm not sure what signal's actual throughput is, but if think as a paid feature it could be economical.
Another crazier way would be to send every message to a large number random latched recipients. Good way to 1000x your bandwidth.
> The metadata is as valuable as the data.
This can be true if you are able to get ahold of a user's device and access their signal messages. It's not true in most other cases. I don't particularly care if you know that I am talking to someone specific as much as I care that you don't know what I'm saying.
> the surveillance networks can capture metadata - who talks to who and when
If this is part of your threat model then I would suggest a different tool such as SimpleX since it uses onion routing and can be configured to always use private routing/relays.
I'm not familiar with SimpleX, but keep in mind only some types of onion routing is secure against a global passive adversary. Famously Tor is not.
Nym is apparently good against a global adversary.
Signal still uses proprietary blob and uses google/apple service for notifications. Use molly.im instead which has solved these problems.
Molly is a security-hardened Signal client only on Android for people unfamiliar. They went through a period of not updating (there were no security updates during that time afaict), but now releases should happen faster on top of Signal.
In Molly there's three options. Google Play Services, WebSocket, and UnifiedPush.
I use the WebSocket and Molly has used >1% of battery since the last full charge so it doesn't seem like play services would improve battery but maybe if I had more apps depending on it..
Google and Apple can't see the notification content but they can see metadata. If you want metadata privacy you should use SimpleX instead anyway.
If you're using WebSocket, how do Google and Apple see metadata? Can someone explain why it's so difficult to make a decent chat app divorced from their ecosystems?
I'm talking about using play services or Apple's version. Signal falls back to a WebSocket if you don't have play services installed.
The native Signal android app delivers notifications just fine without Google play services on my degoogled android.
Same!
I was using Silence from F-Droid for a while back in the day because of these issues, but the lack of interop and needing to make everyone move again soured me on the whole thing. I would rather just get people on XMPP or Matrix and not use some sketchy phone-first app at all. For SMS I use Fossify Messages, which I think was a fork of QKSMS. I don't use SMS as primary or sensitive comms, only as needed. Same as email, basically, but less useful.
I really liked silence. I stopped using it when f-droid said the source code was no longer available. Fossify messages is the best replacement I've found.
(I dont bother with encrypted messenging apps. I prefer to assume that anything I do on my phone is doubleplus unprivate. If I want privacy, I head over to my computer.)
GrapheneOS is more well-roundedly private than any desktop OS.
Competition is Qubes but that has usability issues and does not have good hardware security.
The problem for me is writing on a mobile device is a terrible user experience.
When I'm at home I don't wanna use a virtual keyboard on a 6.3" (or 7.9 unfolded). I just want to use my triple monitor PC setup with a real keyboard and a wealth of display space.
Mobile is cool for on the go but a productivity killer.
I'm not about to trust a google branded device. Even if the Graphene folks are on the up and up, google sure as hell isn't.
That's not based in reality. Why would Google have a hardware backdoor when 99.9% of their users run their software giving them the data they want.
Google Pixels have no evidence of a hardware backdoor when a desktop is proven to be much less secure against remote and local exploitation.
It has been shown through leaks that Pixels running GrapheneOS are the most secure against Cellebrite in AFU. GrapheneOS was the first to implement a reboot timer feature which brings the device to BFU (much more secure) and then Android and iOS copied it (with longer, non-customizable duration).
You can inspect network traffic to see that GrapheneOS phones only connect to GrapheneOS-run services.
Here's a team member's thoughts: https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/10150-not-your-average-why-...
But GrapheneOS relies on a proprietary, black-box security chip from Google... who pinky-promised to open-source it but never did, and that just doesn't sit well with me.
I think it's entirely possible that a compromised Titan module (whether such code ships with the device or is updated at a later point) could leak keys via some covert method, and possibly transmit via the baseband or through some other application/method where the OS is not really aware of what's going on.
I tried it and it was fine while it worked, but eventually I had to go back to regular Signal because Molly's updates did not follow Signal's closely enough, and at some point the server code changed enough to where I was unable to use it for an unacceptable amount of time (after checking, it took them weeks to update). Something to keep in mind if you're not using a custom server.
Maybe it's because I use Molly as a secondary device (my tablet) but I never had an issue where it didn't work for weeks.