To be fair to banks this is what they do with almost all debt their underwrite.
They hold it to help stabilize the market for it while its being sold and then offload it once the market has been established.
Nothing out of hte ordinary here, but to be fair the original article isnt' a financial site so they would have no real idea about how this work behind the scenes.
This doesn't seem like a story at all given how robust this debt is trading.
- I still have a mortgage on a property but don't live there so the mortgage bill gets sent to a different address (b/c rental property)
- Company A originated the mortgage and sells it to Company B
- Company B completely ignores the mailing address and starts sending bills to the original property address
- only through blind luck did I realize that the mortgage bill was being unpaid
This seems like basic, basic bookkeeping but I guess it's also a reminder that "reality has more detail than people realize" and that there are plenty of opportunities for improving systems.
One of those myths too many programmers believe: All street addresses can accept US mail. Not necessarily the issue in this comment, but when somebody gives you both a shipping address and a mailing address and you send mail to the shipping address, the fault is yours if it doesn't arrive.
My mortgage got sold before the first payment. It was in retrospect quite funny because I still get periodic spam emails from the originator as if I'd already be back on the market for another mortgage.
Is there a way that you can track this yourself? I've had three different mortgages [1] in my lifetime and as far as I know it was all completely opaque who/what was ultimately holding the underlying debt.
[1]: First was a decade ago with RMG (a Canadian monoline lender) and the other two with Scotia, the first of which was a fixed mortgage at purchase, and the second was a refinancing.
When your mortgage is sold, you should get a "goodbye letter" from whoever sold it, and a "hello letter" from whoever bought it. This is so you don't keep sending checks to the old place, and have the new people decide that you aren't paying your mortgage.
I don't mean this flippantly, but it's usually whoever you're writing the check to. My first home had the mortgage sold within a week, and someone else started taking the money out of my account.
Some originators will hold on to servicing of your debt wherever it goes (within certain boundaries, e.x. if you go into a delinquency or reconciled delinquency state).
Those originators use it as a selling point, because many people have gotten bit by servicer flips one way or another.
Oh okay, in that case mine were never sold. As in the sibling reply, my assumption is that the "retail" side of the mortgage (who you make your payments to) is fully detached from who ends up owning the mortgage backed securities that your debt is being financed by.
> This doesn't seem like a story at all given how robust this debt is trading.
FTA: That is exactly why CoreWeave-leased paper prices at 7.00% to 9.875%, against the 5.70% to 7.875% that hyperscaler-leased bonds command, per bond market data compiled by CCIR.
Just so were clear: Core weave paid Micron and NVIDA 80 percent margins to buy equipment at a 9 percent lending rate so it can sell it to providers who are subsidizing tokens at 20x their own API prices (that are likely also subsidized).
Could it all work out? It could. But it does not look like there is the financing to keep building - thats going to impact prices and the moment that happens this debt looks even more risky.
> This doesn't seem like a story at all given how robust this debt is trading.
That directly contradicts specific points made in the story, about specific Tier 1 banks and specific amounts of debt not finding buyers. And the amount cited isn't all that great, given the overall equity in play.
> Nothing out of hte[sic] ordinary here
Matthew Moniot, Man Group: "the deal sizes involved are 'out of scale to anything we've thought about, ever.'"
Hard to compare your model with his, since he doesn't have one. When quotes from named credit risk guys from named finance organizations sound like angsty Gen Z, it's not ordinary.
In any case, the story is covering something significant. There is an important test occurring, and we're all going to learn the results, sooner or later. It could all turn out fine, but I don't know. I don't believe you really know either.
Well I'd agree the size of these deals are far larger than any debt deals I can remember in the past 10 years.
But that has nothing to do with the scare tactic headline that says banks are trying tot offload debt. As I said this is exactly how banks work and how they treat all debt they underwrite.
Isn’t this a perfectly normal thing banks do with all large debt? Any bank underwriting any $40b loan was always going to syndicate it.
Not to do so would be reckless.
What is unusual about this is that syndications usually clear in a few weeks but this has been stuck in distribution for six months and still not closed.
> Matthew Moniot, co-head of credit risk sharing at Man Group, told the Financial Times the deal sizes involved are "out of scale to anything we've thought about, ever."
Which of course is a valid point to raise, but you should just say "corporate bond issuance is at a all time high", rather than some clickbait headline about how "Banks are now trying to offload the AI data center debt" and it's "out of scale to anything we've thought about, ever."
>It's not a clickbait headline. It's a direct quote.
I'm chastising the author of the article, for the "Banks are now trying to offload..." framing, not the commenter. Hopefully the fact that I was commenting about the headline made this clear.
>And the key point of it is not "larger than ever" but "out of scale"?
Isn't that "larger than ever" but with more exclamation points?
What is unusual about this is not that it is a single debt of that size but that it is Oracle that is the poor quality indicator.
And it's just one of them: they know that there is about three trillion dollars of this risky shit out there either in the hyperscaler/FAANG balance sheets or off the books and others are reaching the limits of their appetites for it, so they are going to struggle to sell this particular debt, and meanwhile Oracle's position gets worse every day.
We are getting a lot closer to the Margin Call crisis meeting moment where one bank decides it cannot assess the risk of their share of it, are we not?
But this time it is happening in a world where retail investors, lawyers, government officials, elected representatives are much more likely to have seen Margin Call and The Big Short.
Everyone knows these loans are dogshit but if anyone moves first to say so then everyone else’s loans basically are screwed too. So everyone is incentivized to pretend like there’s no problem even though everyone knows there’s a problem.
The trigger in Margin Call was not that they could not assess the risk, it was that they were improperly assessing the risk, had taken too much risk onboard, and the downside of the risk was more than the value of the firm.
Yes, and no. The film is not really about that one day or that one discovery.
Much of what Margin Call is about has already happened in the few days and weeks before the day in the movie — the events that precipitated the widespread firings, including a rather deliberate firing of the head of risk assessment, but are not really discussed.
In the meeting, Sullivan is talking about the music slowing, saying "if the music were to stop…". He's suggesting that the situation is bad, in the context of the un-discussed preceding days, so some action is needed, which is why he escalated.
Tuld saying he fears he "can't hear anything" is about much more fundamental uncertainty — his own belief that no set of numbers could be useful (he didn't even want to discuss the numbers in the report) and that the actual situation required acting on his gut instinct that it was much, much worse.
He, basically, thinks the risk cannot be assessed ("Im telling you, this is it!") and arbitrary action is needed.
In short, the point is he did not have any confidence they could ride out the consequences of the preceding, largely un-discussed few days, because they were beyond their parameters, and that there was no time to assess the real risk.
The trigger for the action is not the newly correct numbers in Sullivan's report, but Tuld's belief that even those numbers were no guide for anything.
(Sam's dog dying after his sad failure of a divorce is a crucial metaphor — the dog days are literally and metaphorically over)
Listening to Ed Zitron on various podcasts, there are several issues with Oracle stocks:
1. they are one place above junk;
2. they are being treated as effectively junk;
3. if they get classified as junk, any pension portfolios holding Oracle stock must sell as they can't hold junk stocks.
If that happens then there will be a cascade of effects. Not just in the AI/datacentre sector but elsewhere, as Larry Ellison holds a stake in Paramount/helped finance the Paramount/WB merger.
Oracle's force majeure notice on a data centre build-out is not helping, I am sure.
(Can't remember, is it this Texas one?)
ETA: This whole Oracle bit is really the area of Zitron's predictions that is the least contentious: he called things, they are happening.
The big question is to what extent this is a harbinger of bad things. In a less crazy market where the value of enterprise-software-backed consultancy is stable or growing, you can imagine people lining up to bite off chunks from the carcass of a failed Oracle. But is the value of enterprise software even stable? Aren't many of the possible buyers also overextending themselves?
ETA 2: No, the potential force majeure is about a project in New Mexico, apparently
>3. if they get classified as junk, any pension portfolios holding Oracle stock must sell as they can't hold junk stocks.
Wouldn't hedge funds or PE recognize this arbitrage opportunity and eat this up, making this a non-issue? Vastly simplifying this: suppose "junk bond" means the chance of default is greater or equal to 10%. Of course it's bad if the risk of oracle going bankrupt edges up from 9% to 10.1%, but we shouldn't expect pandemonium from the 10% cliff edge, because there's plenty to be made by selling all the bonds that pension funds are obligated to sell, because now they have higher yields (yields move inverse to bond prices).
Because assuming the premise is true, there will be a dip in bond prices (ie. higher yields) when oracle gets downgraded, because pension funds or whatever have to dump their holdings. You buy the dip, not at the top.
Because the general consensus at this point appears to be that the notes will fail. You wouldn’t buy a loan if you thought it wasn’t going to be repaid.
I guess, maybe, but perhaps the risk that GP is commenting on is that it could be it's own form of Juicing.
I do sincerely doubt, even with the big shifts that AI enables to have companies 'move away' from Oracle, that Oracle will default.
On the other hand, There's still an elevated chance of decline.
IOW, Those stocks might move from pension type plans to different baskets as a result, however there is a non-negligible risk of some (not total!) loss in the 5-10 year term.
Will add, I would -hope- that the same pension rules around selling questionable stocks, would also have rules limiting what level of exploitation is possible.
Equity shares do not have ratings, bonds have ratings. Everything else is correct, if their bond ratings slip one more level they will be rated junk which may force some holders to liquidate if they’re not allowed to hold junk bonds.
But if Oracle crashes and burns, is that going to tank the whole industry, or is it more likely that the bigger players just eat it up and take its customer?
Oracle is a really serious problem, because they actually are too big to fail. Nobody can take Oracle's core business that quickly. So multiple governments, internationally, are going to have to step in to preserve the various outposts of Oracle that keep them and major organisations running.
Those bits could be sold off to different global consulting firms, I suspect.
(But aren't those global consulting firms also going to be freaked out about their own AI risks? And what does the whole AI-assisted coding thing do to a sober assessment of what all of Oracle's global business is worth? Lots of unanswered questions)
Also that is not the AI data centre bits; those will have to be chopped off and dumped.
If that doesn't seriously spook the markets — a company as well-known and formerly blue-chip as Oracle, needing an international bailout — then it would be kind of surprising.
Everyone is salivating at the prospect of One Rich A-hole Called Larry Ellison getting his come-uppance, but this is the correct take. Oracle without cloud is still a profitable (if much smaller) business that can continue on for quite a while. Larry (along with everyone else holding $ORCL) gets hosed, but corporations will still continue to get extortion requests couched as "opportunities to license Java 8"
Oracle’s customers/counterparties aren’t really at risk of becoming unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy situation though, so there’s no contagion risk, so “too big to fail” does not mean what it means when you’re talking about a systemically important financial institution.
Yeah, like what happened in the 2008 financial crisis where governments had to step in to save the banks as people defaulted on housing payments due to high mortgages.
Oracle is already close to being classified as junk and reaching a tipping point. If/when that happens it is unclear what affect that will have on the markets on companies invested in AI datacenters with Oracle, and other companies that Larry Ellison and other Oracle investors own shares in.
Yes — I think the thrust of it is that Oracle is unusual because all of their risk is on their books, right? They aren't using SPVs. So it's much clearer.
So the worry is that it makes it clear that the unexamined risk in the SPVs has a lot less light shed on it.
Their software is embedded into so many governments and Fortune 500s. It also makes them unlikely to go completely bankrupt but just Chapter 11, reorganize and sell off those parts.
Massively not an expert, but at that level, things are not a binary "good/bad investment". Financial institutions have policies regarding finely sliced debt types, ratios, risks, lengths, sectors, etc.
I personally think it's all hugely overcomplicating things but that's the way modern world works.
(until it every now and then, on regular intervals, doesn't:)
The short answer is to free up money to make other investments.
The longer answer is that banks generally have policies about how concentrated they can be in individual borrowers, industry sectors, geographies, etc. That is why you rarely see a single bank take all of a very large corporate loan. They syndicate it out.
I saw an article a couple of days ago on one of the popular sites (ft or Bloomberg or something), about how now is a great opportunity to purchase private company credit.
Guess this is the submarine https://paulgraham.com/submarine.html
Private credit is far different than the debt of a public ally traded company. It is far riskier as those companies can't easily tap the credit or equity markets for new money if they get into trouble the way a public company can.
But the debt we are talking about is not Private credit debt, its completely different animal with far different risk characteristics
The problem with private credit is that most of the valuations are not publicly tested.
what do I mean by that? oracle is publicly traded, which means they (should) report profit loss and other key metrics in a standardised way. This means that one company's metrics should be comparable to others. Their value is assessed by the second on a public market. This means that anything that affects thier value (real or imagined) is reflected almost instantly. (same goes for debt)
Private credit, and the stuff its invested in, is much murkier. THey do not have the same public reporting rules. There is no testing of value. Its in the interest of the owner of that debt to talk up the value of the assets they hold.
This means that a fund might invest in 10 companies. Those companies might be doing well, or they might not. Because information is limited, and there are no public trades, the value of those companies are only ever tested at sale, or in a crisis. (ie they fold, or do something so public that they can't avoid the consequences.)
THe problem then is that because information is limited (was it a one off, did the owner hide the problem, did they use the wrong investment strategey, is the rest of the portfolio also over valued by 10x?) causes people to panic, and withdraw money.
Because private credit is not that liquid, it means that if people withdraw too much money, they either have to say "no we have no free cash" (lehman brothers insolvancy), they have to take out bridging loans (expensive and very short term) or sell assets (fire sales rarely get good value and shrink the credit supply)
All of which causes a panic, and people look at places like softbank, see the leverage and think "oh fuck thats not worth anything" and the bubble pops.
Modern finance is basically a collaborative fiction. Its fine so long as everyone buys into the same narrative. As soon as someone says "no, why?" the whole thing falls of the rails.
But luckily for the modern financial system, there are enough watchdogs lured with its narratives into willingness to enforce their coherency with weapons.
Had temporary acronym overload, unpacking for anyone else:
There was a cringe-named Republican bill from the beginning of Trump's term, it somehow(?) relaxed the Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio, and the eSLR is one of several related rules on very big banks that deter them taking on "too much" risk.
Loans are sold off, which means that they can raise more money to make loans. Each time you do that, you create more money out of thin air, which is profit.
The problem is, it only works if everyone believes.
THe problem with 2008 is that people stopped believing and demanded banks settle immediately. which then meant that they needed to raise cash, which meant looking at their assets, which meant looking at the risks of those assets, and then it went to shit.
You might as well say that banks giving mortgages caused that. Sure it happened as part of the process but that wasn't the thing that caused the problem.
> In the early 2000s, the debt underpinning CDOs was generally diversified, but by 2006–2007—when the CDO market grew to hundreds of billions of dollars—this had changed. CDO collateral became dominated by high risk (BBB or A) tranches recycled from other asset-backed securities, whose assets were usually subprime mortgages. These CDOs have been called "the engine that powered the mortgage supply chain" for subprime mortgages, and are credited with giving lenders greater incentive to make subprime loans, leading to the 2007–2009 subprime mortgage crisis.
No, to be more specific, banks selling the collateralized mortgages that were subprime in risk as if they were prime and these risk ratings being accepted at their word and via collusion with the ratings agencies is what caused this.
There is no issue with collateralized debt as long as the risk is properly assessed, the whole point of securitization is that you can take on higher risk for higher reward of an asset that was previously just one single piece of risk.
The nuance here, though, was that the CDOs and similar instruments were sold in a tranched fashion, and the super-senior tranche was made to look as if it was very low risk, as normal for tranches instruments.
But when your entire series of tranches all consists of trash, then which tranche you were in didn't really matter.
CDO and CDO2 instruments hid this distinction really well, and unfortunately the ratings agencies bought into it and sold crap as AAA securities.
This is an oversimplification. It is straightforwardly correct that, for any imperfectly correlated basket of assets, the senior slice will be safer than the junior slice. If you hold the most senior 10% of a basket of mortgages, 90% of those mortgages would need to default for you to start taking losses. That is rare in any context and in fact there is a good bit of evidence that AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities didn't actually do all that badly in the 2008 crisis: https://www.nber.org/papers/w24509
There were a lot of factors that contributed to the 2008 crisis: adverse selection leading to low quality portfolios, mispriced assets, high leverage which magnified losses, lower-quality securities being held by investors who couldn't really afford to bear the losses on them, etc. But the fundamental concept of tranching is not actually that bad, even though every time people read about it they think it's the exact same as 2008. Banks have been tranching debt since long before 2008 and they have been tranching debt ever since. Not just mortgages either, but all kinds of debt.
> Cloud computing giant Oracle Corp is on the cusp of a junk-grade credit rating and its shares have tanked as the artificial intelligence hyperscaler becomes the fall guy of investors' concerns over the sector's debt-fuelled spending binge.
Honestly, that would be more like the railway mania in the 1840s or, really, insert any "Panic of X" here. Speculative mania has been a thing for centuries and will continue to be a thing for a centuries.
The specific problem of the 2008 financial crisis was that the banks were going out of their way to obfuscate the source of their CDOs so that, even when it was clear in 2007 that the subprime mortgage market was unraveling, you couldn't look at your instruments and figure out whether or not you were affected. The problem wasn't the CDO, it was the obfuscation. And as far as I'm aware, the current debt offerings aren't being obfuscated--if you want to avoid the data center debt because you think it's junk, just avoid the stuff being touted as data center debt.
> The problem wasn't the CDO, it was the obfuscation.
yes, i specificly remember when Lehman went under the banks stopped trusting each other's ability to assess their own exposure. The banks stopped lending to other banks and that's when Paulson got on his knees (literally, i think there's a picture of him on his knees in front of Nancy Pelosi) asking congress for cash to guarantee loans. The side effects started squirting out everywhere i think even Mcdonald's was hours away from bankruptcy because the corporate paper market suddenly ceased to exist. Also, money market returns turned negative briefly, that's like a negative interest rate on a traditional savings account bad. It was bizarro world for maybe 72hrs.
The movies don't really do justice to just how upside down and nonsensical the financial world became. It was a knife's edge for 2 or 3 days.
One complication this time is that the picture is reversed. Both the executive branch and Congress have massive incentives to keep the music playing. Nobody is going to have to beg Mike Johnson to step in, as he'll happily do whatever the White House says. Yes, there will presumably be a new Speaker after the election, but how much will that matter?
My fear is that this is all going to turn into one big front-running exercise where those connected with the Trump crime family are warned to get out first, banks that swear allegiance are bailed out next, and the rest of us get to hold the bag.
It’s also hard to ignore differences. Bubbles gonna bubble, but the consumer is quite healthy this time around. Burry being short doesn’t make it 2008.
> Wage growth has remained relatively muted over the past year. That, combined with higher inflation, means Americans are earning less for an hour of work. Average hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation, fell 0.5 percent in September, and were down 0.7 percent from a year earlier. It was the sixth straight month of year-over-year declines in real earnings.
> The share of seriously delinquent auto loan balances has hit a record high this year, while nearly 13% of credit card balances are seriously past due — close to their 2010 peak in the aftermath of the housing crisis — according to recent data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
> The ability of U.S. families to stay current on their debts worsened over the past three years, hitting levels not seen since the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve reported Friday.
> Wage growth has remained relatively muted over the past year. That, combined with higher inflation, means Americans are earning less for an hour of work. Average hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation, fell 0.5 percent in September, and were down 0.7 percent from a year earlier. It was the sixth straight month of year-over-year declines in real earnings.
Where are they getting this data? This directly contradicts their claim:
> Real average hourly earnings for all employees decreased 0.5 percent from August to September,
seasonally adjusted, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today… From September 2025 to September 2026, real average hourly earnings decreased 0.7 percent,
seasonally adjusted.
Your chart appears to be weekly earnings, not per-hour wages. Having to pick up more shifts or a second job to make ends meet supports the point, in my book.
Another factor in that case was that the government regulated, in some cases, the ratings of bonds that entities were allowed to buy (they couldn't be as highly levered with lower rated bonds) and so there was an incentive for bond ratings to be falsely inflated, happily carried out by the rating agencies. Of course collateralized junk is still junk, and many people at the time knew that, but there was money to be made in looking the other way.
Adjusting for inflation, though, things also can happen faster now than, say, thirty years ago, and there's more centralization in quite a few industries.
> Adjusting for inflation, though, things also can happen faster now than, say, thirty years ago, and there's more centralization in quite a few industries.
Not sure its just related to centralization, probably more so that information can flow more freely now, but I fully agree.
And for this one when insurance companies are forming syndicates because their underwriting becomes greater than any one company, it just sounds frightening, the sound this thing is going to make when it finally pops.
yeah, either they discount it enough to look worthwhile to someone, or they keep it and take the risk. Risk assessments are inherently subjective, so both parties can think they're making a deal.
>We lent £1,000 to John Sozzleby at 10%. We quantify the risk level as “iffy”, which is 42.6 qualm points above "dodgy". and are willing to sell you the debt for £700. its a great deal!
> They sell down debt when they are worried about concentration, which is exactly what "approaching internal limits" means in plain English: too much of this bank's balance sheet is now one bet on one sector holding up.
Which is correct, but kind of weird because being confident in a credit and being worried about concentration are not really mutually exclusive things. You can be pretty confident in an investment but not want it to constitute a majority of your portfolio. (Bankers know that even very strong credits are never 100% guaranteed to pay out.)
Let's say I offered you the chance to pay $100 to get $120 back if at least one coin toss in five came up heads. That's a pretty good bet, right? But would you bet your house on it?
I remember in Summer 2007 feeling that there was an impending implosion coming based on the shady practice of using 2nd mortgages as downpayments - it had become a common practice. Started doing a bit of shorting (not too much), made a little, lost a little and then sort of lost interest in doing it just about the time things fell apart in '08. All that to say that these things can take a lot longer than you'd expect. You can look at the situation (like the circular funding as well as this article) and decide that yes it's not sustainable. But it can sustain longer than you expect.
Oh, I am well aware it's hard to time it. But still getting a general sense of the impending crash can help preparing in different ways. You can park part of your assets, not completely withdraw. Or pay extra for piece of mind by hedging them. Sure, it will cost, maybe won't be needed at all, or still misfired, but I'll sleep better with less anxiety, so that's still a win in my book...
Yeah. The thing is, we were being told that was a problem in late 2004 (this is when Max Keiser was writing and talking about the risks to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; he and others saying this were written off as cranks, even though they laid out a pretty solid scenario that came substantially true.)
So yes, Oracle is likely a canary in the coal mine.
It can only really be seen as an indicator of hidden risks to the banks from exposure to the SPVs.
But how long it will take before the miners start dropping dead from the fumes, who knows. Could be years, could be a few weeks after the Anthropic IPO when people are sitting smoking on the steps to the helipad saying "what the fuck? No I mean, really, really. What the fuck!"
With these things it's not about spotting the signs but rather predicting the timing. Everyone and their dog can see the signs but that's not enough to be actionable
The big two AI labs are still not listed on the stock market, and SPCX is still above it's listing price. Unless you can remain liquid more than the market remains irrational better find some other use for your investment funds. No?
Not sure I agree. The credit default swaps have been extremely expensive lately, meaning that someone is already thinking about an AI bubble popping that will take private credit down which will make banks take a serious hit (11% of their outstanding loans are to linked to AI). On top of that we are in a time where the economy is propped up basically by AI spending and delinquencies on all sort of debt are at historically high rates.
This is common. Selling debt is normal. If there is money to be made by selling the debt and going back to issuing more loans, they’ll try to find a buyer.
Everyone is so primed to believe that all things related to data centers are bad that they’ll assume this is a special event. The person writing the headline knows that.
Who is building the infrastructure to resell the gpus from failed data centers if / when this collapses. It would be a waste for everything to get wasted
The GPUs used in data centers cant really be used outside the same context. They cant connect to standard PCs or servers. They are highly specialized. The resale would need to be at the server or rack level for the same use case.
Indeed, also even the air cooled ones are designed for high static pressure fans (ie small fans that spin at really high RPMs). Those fans are really really loud.
You can just mod them to run on consumer fans that are designed to spin much slower but have higher diameter
Yes, they're "just" pcie, though units like H100 and newer (or did it start with pascal? i really don't know) have variants that use a proprietary connector called SXM, but it's always just pcie lanes underneath. In some versions there are interposer and mezzanine boards, but again, pcie with associated bits and bobs like retimers and pcie switches. Not impossible to integrate, just annoying.
I mean it's not that hard. It's just hard if your frame of reference is "can I download it within one click on my $6000 Macbook".
This whole subthread is just sad. "Oh no, it's not the same form factor. It is useless".
Where's the "Hacker" in "Hacker News" there.
It's a shame that we need to defer to "China" as a shorthand for "actual engineers" just because our own engineers lack imagination and drive that would validate being given that title in the first place.
> It's a shame that we need to defer to "China" as a shorthand for "actual engineers" just because our own engineers lack imagination and drive that would validate being given that title in the first place.
There are a lot of reasons other than skill why China is the way it is. Culture and locality are big ones. I don't know a whole lot but I disagree that any "actual engineer" could easily come up with a sustainable business for this stuff in the US -- for example, harvesting and processing used parts for their components is a hugely laborious process, and China has a huge culture of recycling and reworking that simply does not exist in the US (and would largely be socially unacceptable to introduce!). Take for example the pre-modded 4090s, or the BGA desktop motherboards I mentioned, or any number of other products that are based not merely on sheer engineering. It's not exactly engineering on its own that causes these things to happen, but more the fact that nearly anybody can just throw together an operation like that and have tons of workers available to make it sustainable.
I do believe that your assessment that it will come from China is right.
Though, at least the "coming up with the idea" is something that could be done in the West I would argue. We too could read datasheets and probe stuff. We just chose not to.
Please don't misunderstand me as attacking you. I was attacking that other guy further up the thread with the empty GitHub account and the equally empty ambitions, trying to drag all of us crabs back into this bucket we find ourselves in.
> I do believe that your assessment that it will come from China is right. Though, at least the "coming up with the idea" is something that could be done in the West I would argue. We too could read datasheets and probe stuff. We just chose not to.
Oh, plenty of people do not choose not to -- there are tons of blog posts and YouTube videos out there of people doing stuff exactly like this! It's just the making it sustainable part that's very difficult outside of somewhere like China, because -- unless you have special VC privilege -- you can't really offer reasonable prices to the masses, which makes your purchase volume go down, which further drives up your prices even more, until it converges on some insane number.
There have been some examples of folks ripping off the SMX interface and rewiring the card for PCI-E but I'm not sure how efficient that would really be or what kind of market there could be
This sounds like fearmongering. Banks aren't in the business of collecting on debt. They are in the business of writing loans they can sell to people who collect the debt. This is pretty standard business in the 2020s. Not defending data centers or AI or whatever, not denying that there is an AI bubble. Just saying that this is how business is done now.
Why? It's hard to see what they're good for outside of AI data center workloads. Your average member of the general public arguably doesn't have much use for a "graphics processing unit" that isn't actually capable of processing graphics
I don't see how. I'm not saying that consumer-grade hardware isn't useful because enterprise-grade hardware exists. I'm saying that enterprise-grade hardware isn't particularly practical for most consumers. Personal computers were many things, but what they generally weren't was people installing IBM S/390s in their living rooms. Because some of the same design features that make them great for centralized, high volume business workloads also makes them kind of a PITA if that isn't what you need.
For my part, I do work on machine learning projects at home. But I'm nowhere near operating at a scale where datacenter GPU features like being optimized for 4- and 8-bit calculations would be a net benefit. Nor do I have any particular desire to have one of those things making my home office sound like I live next to a steel mill.
It's not too far off from why I don't have a box truck parked in my garage even though it's technically more capable than my Kia. And on the occasions when that is what I need, the local hardware store will gladly rent one to me for $20 per day.
Mainframes did not make and still don't make very good personal computers. Same goes for these "gpus". They are the modern day mainframes. (I know we still have mainframes, but that is besides analog)
They can have a pretty good LLM running in there, or cad design. For the average joe, having the free tier of AI without the breach of privacy is pretty good already.
Sorry if this appears obtuse, but what exactly is an “AI Data Center”?
Is it a data center with nothing but GPUs, that does nothing but inference all day and all night?
Is it a data center custom-built for only AI companies to use?
Do these “AI Data Centers” have data storage? VPS? …
Or, as I suspect, is “AI Data Center” simply a fake media buzzword that really means “Normal Data Centers” but with political baggage and stigma built-in.
> Or, as I suspect, is “AI Data Center” simply a fake media buzzword that really means “Normal Data Centers” but with political baggage and stigma built-in.
No you're absolutely right. The only difference that I can tell is power requirements are legitimately higher because GPUs consume more electricity. More cooling is also needed because there's more heat generated. Aside from those two things, it's a plain old datacenter that companies have been building at break neck speeds since like 1996. Now that I think about it, how come there's no panic about additional Internet backbone capacity needed to support these "AI datacenters"?
It's a data centre being build specifically to run LLMs (and possibly other ML models). As such, it will be focused on NVIDIA servers with large numbers of inter-connected GPUs (so they can run the 2T-4T parameter models from OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) [1].
It's a different build-out to a data centre that can host video/YouTube content (fast CPU, no GPU, large number/size of hard drives), or that can run web servers (fast CPUs, low to average hard drive capacity).
The next token prediction machine is writing 90%+ code at multi-trillion $$$ companies, its already solved millennial problems -- but yes its definitely not living up to hype.
But it's creating new problems, and when the damage those new problems outweighs the value created, then that's when the bubble starts (or started) to form and we live in a delusion until the damage massively outweigh the benefits, is when the bubble popping starts being considered, and then when there's irreversible damage is when the bubble popping is marked for formal revision and then when ...
This tracks with recent reporting that AI debt issuance fell 50% month over month in September[0]
> Tech companies raised $23 billion in AI-related debt globally in September, less than half the amount raised in August, according to Morgan Stanley data covering public bonds and private placement transactions.
> The decline marks a continued drop from June, when companies raised a record $113 billion for AI infrastructure including data centers and chips. In the US investment-grade market, where blue-chip tech groups borrowed around $306 billion between January and August, AI-related bond issuance stopped completely last month.
To make senes of the drop we need to know how much they expected to raise in September. Were the expecting to raise $50B but only raised $23B? Or were they expecting to raise $25B but only raised $23B? That's an important detail. Further, "bond issuance stopped"... was that intentional or not? It's like we're getting half the story and then have to use our imagination and biases to make the story as bad as possible.
ftfa "Morgan Stanley attributed the decline to the large amount of debt already raised earlier this year."
The CDSs on some loans are getting to the point where it’s too expensive to even bet that the loans will fail as the CDS market seems to have concluded the loans will fail.
> The CDOs on some loans are getting to the point where it’s too expensive to even bet that the loans will fail as the CDO market seems to have concluded the loans will fail.
Did you mean CDS? As your sentence doens't make sense as its written.
To be fair to banks this is what they do with almost all debt their underwrite.
They hold it to help stabilize the market for it while its being sold and then offload it once the market has been established.
Nothing out of hte ordinary here, but to be fair the original article isnt' a financial site so they would have no real idea about how this work behind the scenes.
This doesn't seem like a story at all given how robust this debt is trading.
Banks don't want to own anything. They want to get their share and pass on the risk.
My mortgage has been sold almost a half dozen times already.
My favorite was the following:
- I still have a mortgage on a property but don't live there so the mortgage bill gets sent to a different address (b/c rental property)
- Company A originated the mortgage and sells it to Company B
- Company B completely ignores the mailing address and starts sending bills to the original property address
- only through blind luck did I realize that the mortgage bill was being unpaid
This seems like basic, basic bookkeeping but I guess it's also a reminder that "reality has more detail than people realize" and that there are plenty of opportunities for improving systems.
One of those myths too many programmers believe: All street addresses can accept US mail. Not necessarily the issue in this comment, but when somebody gives you both a shipping address and a mailing address and you send mail to the shipping address, the fault is yours if it doesn't arrive.
I remember getting a mortgage and the loan officer saying that there was a 100% possibility that the loan would be sold within 60 days of closing.
My mortgage got sold before the first payment. It was in retrospect quite funny because I still get periodic spam emails from the originator as if I'd already be back on the market for another mortgage.
Is there a way that you can track this yourself? I've had three different mortgages [1] in my lifetime and as far as I know it was all completely opaque who/what was ultimately holding the underlying debt.
[1]: First was a decade ago with RMG (a Canadian monoline lender) and the other two with Scotia, the first of which was a fixed mortgage at purchase, and the second was a refinancing.
When your mortgage is sold, you should get a "goodbye letter" from whoever sold it, and a "hello letter" from whoever bought it. This is so you don't keep sending checks to the old place, and have the new people decide that you aren't paying your mortgage.
Composition vs inheritance maybe makes a difference here? :thinking_grimace:
What I mean is parent companies and contracts that might obfuscate who's owed the debt.
However, I don't know anything about debt markets let alone homeownership.
I don't mean this flippantly, but it's usually whoever you're writing the check to. My first home had the mortgage sold within a week, and someone else started taking the money out of my account.
The servicing company could be different than whoever actually owns the debt.
Yep.
Some originators will hold on to servicing of your debt wherever it goes (within certain boundaries, e.x. if you go into a delinquency or reconciled delinquency state).
Those originators use it as a selling point, because many people have gotten bit by servicer flips one way or another.
Oh okay, in that case mine were never sold. As in the sibling reply, my assumption is that the "retail" side of the mortgage (who you make your payments to) is fully detached from who ends up owning the mortgage backed securities that your debt is being financed by.
After being chopped up and bundled with safe loans being mixed with non safe loans so nobody has any idea what’s being bought.
Where have I heard this before.
Probably from Margot Robbie :-)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GrZyx4bNvs8
> My mortgage has been sold almost a half dozen times already.
Sure that could be true, but that has nothing to do with the public debt we're talking about.
Completely different markets.
That's like me saying the condo Market in Miami is hot and you rebutting that single family homes in HOA's in Phoenix are not hot right now.
Both can be true at the same time as they are completely different market that are only very tangentially relate.
> This doesn't seem like a story at all given how robust this debt is trading.
FTA: That is exactly why CoreWeave-leased paper prices at 7.00% to 9.875%, against the 5.70% to 7.875% that hyperscaler-leased bonds command, per bond market data compiled by CCIR.
Just so were clear: Core weave paid Micron and NVIDA 80 percent margins to buy equipment at a 9 percent lending rate so it can sell it to providers who are subsidizing tokens at 20x their own API prices (that are likely also subsidized).
Could it all work out? It could. But it does not look like there is the financing to keep building - thats going to impact prices and the moment that happens this debt looks even more risky.
> This doesn't seem like a story at all given how robust this debt is trading.
That directly contradicts specific points made in the story, about specific Tier 1 banks and specific amounts of debt not finding buyers. And the amount cited isn't all that great, given the overall equity in play.
> Nothing out of hte[sic] ordinary here
Matthew Moniot, Man Group: "the deal sizes involved are 'out of scale to anything we've thought about, ever.'"
Hard to compare your model with his, since he doesn't have one. When quotes from named credit risk guys from named finance organizations sound like angsty Gen Z, it's not ordinary.
In any case, the story is covering something significant. There is an important test occurring, and we're all going to learn the results, sooner or later. It could all turn out fine, but I don't know. I don't believe you really know either.
Well I'd agree the size of these deals are far larger than any debt deals I can remember in the past 10 years.
But that has nothing to do with the scare tactic headline that says banks are trying tot offload debt. As I said this is exactly how banks work and how they treat all debt they underwrite.
Isn’t this a perfectly normal thing banks do with all large debt? Any bank underwriting any $40b loan was always going to syndicate it.
Not to do so would be reckless.
What is unusual about this is that syndications usually clear in a few weeks but this has been stuck in distribution for six months and still not closed.
> Matthew Moniot, co-head of credit risk sharing at Man Group, told the Financial Times the deal sizes involved are "out of scale to anything we've thought about, ever."
Isn't that just because corporate bond issuance is at a all time high?
https://www.economist.com/content-assets/images/20260711_EPC...
Which of course is a valid point to raise, but you should just say "corporate bond issuance is at a all time high", rather than some clickbait headline about how "Banks are now trying to offload the AI data center debt" and it's "out of scale to anything we've thought about, ever."
It's not a clickbait headline. It's a direct quote.
And the key point of it is not "larger than ever" but "out of scale"?
>It's not a clickbait headline. It's a direct quote.
I'm chastising the author of the article, for the "Banks are now trying to offload..." framing, not the commenter. Hopefully the fact that I was commenting about the headline made this clear.
>And the key point of it is not "larger than ever" but "out of scale"?
Isn't that "larger than ever" but with more exclamation points?
"Out of scale" when it is a risk management firm chap saying it, sounds like a polite way to say "abnormal" without scaring the straights.
(At least is the way I read it: not just large but abnormal in context)
What is unusual about this is not that it is a single debt of that size but that it is Oracle that is the poor quality indicator.
And it's just one of them: they know that there is about three trillion dollars of this risky shit out there either in the hyperscaler/FAANG balance sheets or off the books and others are reaching the limits of their appetites for it, so they are going to struggle to sell this particular debt, and meanwhile Oracle's position gets worse every day.
We are getting a lot closer to the Margin Call crisis meeting moment where one bank decides it cannot assess the risk of their share of it, are we not?
But this time it is happening in a world where retail investors, lawyers, government officials, elected representatives are much more likely to have seen Margin Call and The Big Short.
Yes this is basically the Margin Call situation.
Everyone knows these loans are dogshit but if anyone moves first to say so then everyone else’s loans basically are screwed too. So everyone is incentivized to pretend like there’s no problem even though everyone knows there’s a problem.
The trigger in Margin Call was not that they could not assess the risk, it was that they were improperly assessing the risk, had taken too much risk onboard, and the downside of the risk was more than the value of the firm.
Yes, and no. The film is not really about that one day or that one discovery.
Much of what Margin Call is about has already happened in the few days and weeks before the day in the movie — the events that precipitated the widespread firings, including a rather deliberate firing of the head of risk assessment, but are not really discussed.
In the meeting, Sullivan is talking about the music slowing, saying "if the music were to stop…". He's suggesting that the situation is bad, in the context of the un-discussed preceding days, so some action is needed, which is why he escalated.
Tuld saying he fears he "can't hear anything" is about much more fundamental uncertainty — his own belief that no set of numbers could be useful (he didn't even want to discuss the numbers in the report) and that the actual situation required acting on his gut instinct that it was much, much worse.
He, basically, thinks the risk cannot be assessed ("Im telling you, this is it!") and arbitrary action is needed.
In short, the point is he did not have any confidence they could ride out the consequences of the preceding, largely un-discussed few days, because they were beyond their parameters, and that there was no time to assess the real risk.
The trigger for the action is not the newly correct numbers in Sullivan's report, but Tuld's belief that even those numbers were no guide for anything.
(Sam's dog dying after his sad failure of a divorce is a crucial metaphor — the dog days are literally and metaphorically over)
Listening to Ed Zitron on various podcasts, there are several issues with Oracle stocks:
1. they are one place above junk;
2. they are being treated as effectively junk;
3. if they get classified as junk, any pension portfolios holding Oracle stock must sell as they can't hold junk stocks.
If that happens then there will be a cascade of effects. Not just in the AI/datacentre sector but elsewhere, as Larry Ellison holds a stake in Paramount/helped finance the Paramount/WB merger.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHaPfdnRoZ4 -- Mostly Economics Podcast #55: Who pays when the AI bubble bursts with Ed Zitron (12:36 - 23:53)
Oracle's force majeure notice on a data centre build-out is not helping, I am sure.
(Can't remember, is it this Texas one?)
ETA: This whole Oracle bit is really the area of Zitron's predictions that is the least contentious: he called things, they are happening.
The big question is to what extent this is a harbinger of bad things. In a less crazy market where the value of enterprise-software-backed consultancy is stable or growing, you can imagine people lining up to bite off chunks from the carcass of a failed Oracle. But is the value of enterprise software even stable? Aren't many of the possible buyers also overextending themselves?
ETA 2: No, the potential force majeure is about a project in New Mexico, apparently
>3. if they get classified as junk, any pension portfolios holding Oracle stock must sell as they can't hold junk stocks.
Wouldn't hedge funds or PE recognize this arbitrage opportunity and eat this up, making this a non-issue? Vastly simplifying this: suppose "junk bond" means the chance of default is greater or equal to 10%. Of course it's bad if the risk of oracle going bankrupt edges up from 9% to 10.1%, but we shouldn't expect pandemonium from the 10% cliff edge, because there's plenty to be made by selling all the bonds that pension funds are obligated to sell, because now they have higher yields (yields move inverse to bond prices).
Why aren't the PE firms buying this debt right now though, before Oracle is downgraded? Isn't that a better purchase?
(Sincere, not rhetorical questions)
Because assuming the premise is true, there will be a dip in bond prices (ie. higher yields) when oracle gets downgraded, because pension funds or whatever have to dump their holdings. You buy the dip, not at the top.
Because the general consensus at this point appears to be that the notes will fail. You wouldn’t buy a loan if you thought it wasn’t going to be repaid.
> You wouldn’t buy a loan if you thought it wasn’t going to be repaid.
Eh, people do weird things all the time.
Also, there is often extreme information asymmetry.
Ehhhh?
I guess, maybe, but perhaps the risk that GP is commenting on is that it could be it's own form of Juicing.
I do sincerely doubt, even with the big shifts that AI enables to have companies 'move away' from Oracle, that Oracle will default.
On the other hand, There's still an elevated chance of decline.
IOW, Those stocks might move from pension type plans to different baskets as a result, however there is a non-negligible risk of some (not total!) loss in the 5-10 year term.
Will add, I would -hope- that the same pension rules around selling questionable stocks, would also have rules limiting what level of exploitation is possible.
s/stock/bonds
Equity shares do not have ratings, bonds have ratings. Everything else is correct, if their bond ratings slip one more level they will be rated junk which may force some holders to liquidate if they’re not allowed to hold junk bonds.
You could have made a lot of money betting against Ed Zitron over the past few years. He has predicted 12 of the last 0 AI market crashes.
Of course past performance is no guarantee of future results, as they say.
tbf he only needs to be right once, and at the moment the question of profitability of these frontier companies is still open
But if Oracle crashes and burns, is that going to tank the whole industry, or is it more likely that the bigger players just eat it up and take its customer?
Oracle is a really serious problem, because they actually are too big to fail. Nobody can take Oracle's core business that quickly. So multiple governments, internationally, are going to have to step in to preserve the various outposts of Oracle that keep them and major organisations running.
Those bits could be sold off to different global consulting firms, I suspect.
(But aren't those global consulting firms also going to be freaked out about their own AI risks? And what does the whole AI-assisted coding thing do to a sober assessment of what all of Oracle's global business is worth? Lots of unanswered questions)
Also that is not the AI data centre bits; those will have to be chopped off and dumped.
If that doesn't seriously spook the markets — a company as well-known and formerly blue-chip as Oracle, needing an international bailout — then it would be kind of surprising.
I think liquidation would be unlikely. Restructuring would be more likely. Like as happens with airlines from time to time.
Everyone is salivating at the prospect of One Rich A-hole Called Larry Ellison getting his come-uppance, but this is the correct take. Oracle without cloud is still a profitable (if much smaller) business that can continue on for quite a while. Larry (along with everyone else holding $ORCL) gets hosed, but corporations will still continue to get extortion requests couched as "opportunities to license Java 8"
I don't see a world where Larry gets financially hosed. The whole system is setup to protect him, there will be a parachute.
Oracle’s customers/counterparties aren’t really at risk of becoming unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy situation though, so there’s no contagion risk, so “too big to fail” does not mean what it means when you’re talking about a systemically important financial institution.
Yeah, like what happened in the 2008 financial crisis where governments had to step in to save the banks as people defaulted on housing payments due to high mortgages.
Oracle is already close to being classified as junk and reaching a tipping point. If/when that happens it is unclear what affect that will have on the markets on companies invested in AI datacenters with Oracle, and other companies that Larry Ellison and other Oracle investors own shares in.
Yes — I think the thrust of it is that Oracle is unusual because all of their risk is on their books, right? They aren't using SPVs. So it's much clearer.
So the worry is that it makes it clear that the unexamined risk in the SPVs has a lot less light shed on it.
(ETA: that article suggests Oracle is using SPVs)
Is oracle too big to fail?
I mean yes, there are key contractors for certian things, but depending on the structure they can be chapter 11'd to yeet that debt.
Of course junking all those bonds would cause a crisis.
Their software is embedded into so many governments and Fortune 500s. It also makes them unlikely to go completely bankrupt but just Chapter 11, reorganize and sell off those parts.
I'm confused. Why would you offload it if you thought it was a good investment?
Massively not an expert, but at that level, things are not a binary "good/bad investment". Financial institutions have policies regarding finely sliced debt types, ratios, risks, lengths, sectors, etc.
I personally think it's all hugely overcomplicating things but that's the way modern world works.
(until it every now and then, on regular intervals, doesn't:)
The short answer is to free up money to make other investments.
The longer answer is that banks generally have policies about how concentrated they can be in individual borrowers, industry sectors, geographies, etc. That is why you rarely see a single bank take all of a very large corporate loan. They syndicate it out.
Banks like good investments, but they like being paid fees more
They make money as middlemen, not the ultimate holders of debt.
I saw an article a couple of days ago on one of the popular sites (ft or Bloomberg or something), about how now is a great opportunity to purchase private company credit. Guess this is the submarine https://paulgraham.com/submarine.html
Private credit is far different than the debt of a public ally traded company. It is far riskier as those companies can't easily tap the credit or equity markets for new money if they get into trouble the way a public company can.
But the debt we are talking about is not Private credit debt, its completely different animal with far different risk characteristics
Found it: head of JP Morgan asset management calling "once in a lifetime opportunity to invest in high quality company debt" https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/10/jpmorgan-sees-once-in-a-gene...
Different markets, that is public debt the op was talking about private credit.
I agree with JPM that now is a good time to invest in public debt.
yeah, 10y US T-bills are nearing to 6%,this is actually excellent public debt :-D
The problem with private credit is that most of the valuations are not publicly tested.
what do I mean by that? oracle is publicly traded, which means they (should) report profit loss and other key metrics in a standardised way. This means that one company's metrics should be comparable to others. Their value is assessed by the second on a public market. This means that anything that affects thier value (real or imagined) is reflected almost instantly. (same goes for debt)
Private credit, and the stuff its invested in, is much murkier. THey do not have the same public reporting rules. There is no testing of value. Its in the interest of the owner of that debt to talk up the value of the assets they hold.
This means that a fund might invest in 10 companies. Those companies might be doing well, or they might not. Because information is limited, and there are no public trades, the value of those companies are only ever tested at sale, or in a crisis. (ie they fold, or do something so public that they can't avoid the consequences.)
THe problem then is that because information is limited (was it a one off, did the owner hide the problem, did they use the wrong investment strategey, is the rest of the portfolio also over valued by 10x?) causes people to panic, and withdraw money.
Because private credit is not that liquid, it means that if people withdraw too much money, they either have to say "no we have no free cash" (lehman brothers insolvancy), they have to take out bridging loans (expensive and very short term) or sell assets (fire sales rarely get good value and shrink the credit supply)
All of which causes a panic, and people look at places like softbank, see the leverage and think "oh fuck thats not worth anything" and the bubble pops.
Yep i'd say your comment fully agrees with me.
TLDR;
Modern finance is basically a collaborative fiction. Its fine so long as everyone buys into the same narrative. As soon as someone says "no, why?" the whole thing falls of the rails.
But luckily for the modern financial system, there are enough watchdogs lured with its narratives into willingness to enforce their coherency with weapons.
Hah, this is remarkably short turnaround. The OBBB only lifted the ESLR on April 1!
Had temporary acronym overload, unpacking for anyone else:
There was a cringe-named Republican bill from the beginning of Trump's term, it somehow(?) relaxed the Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio, and the eSLR is one of several related rules on very big banks that deter them taking on "too much" risk.
Wow, 2 lines in and I realize I already read this article waaay back, before I even knew what a startup was, much less who paul graham was.
The world is a napkin
thank you for this link, all these years on the internet and I had not come across it
This is just what banks do O_o underwrite loans, then collateralize (i.e. bundle) to people who want the risk.
> This is just what banks do…
Sure. Sometimes they cause global financial crises as part of that process.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_financial_crisis
Yes, and sometimes they turn Tulips[0] into value stores. Or GPUs for that matter[1].
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulip_mania [1] https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-partners-with-apol...
No but like this is how money supply works.
Loans are sold off, which means that they can raise more money to make loans. Each time you do that, you create more money out of thin air, which is profit.
The problem is, it only works if everyone believes.
THe problem with 2008 is that people stopped believing and demanded banks settle immediately. which then meant that they needed to raise cash, which meant looking at their assets, which meant looking at the risks of those assets, and then it went to shit.
People stopped believing because people stopped paying their mortgages.
You might as well say that banks giving mortgages caused that. Sure it happened as part of the process but that wasn't the thing that caused the problem.
No, banks collateralizing mortgages caused it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateralized_debt_obligation
> In the early 2000s, the debt underpinning CDOs was generally diversified, but by 2006–2007—when the CDO market grew to hundreds of billions of dollars—this had changed. CDO collateral became dominated by high risk (BBB or A) tranches recycled from other asset-backed securities, whose assets were usually subprime mortgages. These CDOs have been called "the engine that powered the mortgage supply chain" for subprime mortgages, and are credited with giving lenders greater incentive to make subprime loans, leading to the 2007–2009 subprime mortgage crisis.
It's hard to ignore the similarities.
No, to be more specific, banks selling the collateralized mortgages that were subprime in risk as if they were prime and these risk ratings being accepted at their word and via collusion with the ratings agencies is what caused this.
There is no issue with collateralized debt as long as the risk is properly assessed, the whole point of securitization is that you can take on higher risk for higher reward of an asset that was previously just one single piece of risk.
This is correct.
The nuance here, though, was that the CDOs and similar instruments were sold in a tranched fashion, and the super-senior tranche was made to look as if it was very low risk, as normal for tranches instruments.
But when your entire series of tranches all consists of trash, then which tranche you were in didn't really matter.
CDO and CDO2 instruments hid this distinction really well, and unfortunately the ratings agencies bought into it and sold crap as AAA securities.
This is an oversimplification. It is straightforwardly correct that, for any imperfectly correlated basket of assets, the senior slice will be safer than the junior slice. If you hold the most senior 10% of a basket of mortgages, 90% of those mortgages would need to default for you to start taking losses. That is rare in any context and in fact there is a good bit of evidence that AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities didn't actually do all that badly in the 2008 crisis: https://www.nber.org/papers/w24509
There were a lot of factors that contributed to the 2008 crisis: adverse selection leading to low quality portfolios, mispriced assets, high leverage which magnified losses, lower-quality securities being held by investors who couldn't really afford to bear the losses on them, etc. But the fundamental concept of tranching is not actually that bad, even though every time people read about it they think it's the exact same as 2008. Banks have been tranching debt since long before 2008 and they have been tranching debt ever since. Not just mortgages either, but all kinds of debt.
> unfortunately the ratings agencies bought into it and sold crap as AAA securities.
It's very hard to understand something when your salary depends on you not understanding something.
They just kept the music going, more ratings issued was more money for them. Paid by the bank creating the security, what could go wrong
> subprime in risk as if they were prime
What if this winds up being the case for the trillions dumped into AI in hopes of future revenues?
https://www.reuters.com/business/oracle-corp-goes-high-stake...
> Cloud computing giant Oracle Corp is on the cusp of a junk-grade credit rating and its shares have tanked as the artificial intelligence hyperscaler becomes the fall guy of investors' concerns over the sector's debt-fuelled spending binge.
Honestly, that would be more like the railway mania in the 1840s or, really, insert any "Panic of X" here. Speculative mania has been a thing for centuries and will continue to be a thing for a centuries.
The specific problem of the 2008 financial crisis was that the banks were going out of their way to obfuscate the source of their CDOs so that, even when it was clear in 2007 that the subprime mortgage market was unraveling, you couldn't look at your instruments and figure out whether or not you were affected. The problem wasn't the CDO, it was the obfuscation. And as far as I'm aware, the current debt offerings aren't being obfuscated--if you want to avoid the data center debt because you think it's junk, just avoid the stuff being touted as data center debt.
> The problem wasn't the CDO, it was the obfuscation.
yes, i specificly remember when Lehman went under the banks stopped trusting each other's ability to assess their own exposure. The banks stopped lending to other banks and that's when Paulson got on his knees (literally, i think there's a picture of him on his knees in front of Nancy Pelosi) asking congress for cash to guarantee loans. The side effects started squirting out everywhere i think even Mcdonald's was hours away from bankruptcy because the corporate paper market suddenly ceased to exist. Also, money market returns turned negative briefly, that's like a negative interest rate on a traditional savings account bad. It was bizarro world for maybe 72hrs.
The movies don't really do justice to just how upside down and nonsensical the financial world became. It was a knife's edge for 2 or 3 days.
One complication this time is that the picture is reversed. Both the executive branch and Congress have massive incentives to keep the music playing. Nobody is going to have to beg Mike Johnson to step in, as he'll happily do whatever the White House says. Yes, there will presumably be a new Speaker after the election, but how much will that matter?
My fear is that this is all going to turn into one big front-running exercise where those connected with the Trump crime family are warned to get out first, banks that swear allegiance are bailed out next, and the rest of us get to hold the bag.
Is the risk on AI debt properly assessed?
Are these companies worth their incredibly high valuations?
> There is no issue with collateralized debt as long as the risk is properly assessed
Yeah... maybe think on that a bit in this context.
It’s also hard to ignore differences. Bubbles gonna bubble, but the consumer is quite healthy this time around. Burry being short doesn’t make it 2008.
> the consumer is quite healthy this time around
Inflation's way up. Real wages are down.
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/14/business/economy/inflatio...
> Wage growth has remained relatively muted over the past year. That, combined with higher inflation, means Americans are earning less for an hour of work. Average hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation, fell 0.5 percent in September, and were down 0.7 percent from a year earlier. It was the sixth straight month of year-over-year declines in real earnings.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/household-debt-delinquencies-ri...
> The share of seriously delinquent auto loan balances has hit a record high this year, while nearly 13% of credit card balances are seriously past due — close to their 2010 peak in the aftermath of the housing crisis — according to recent data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/09/american-debt-delinquency.ht...
> The ability of U.S. families to stay current on their debts worsened over the past three years, hitting levels not seen since the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve reported Friday.
> Wage growth has remained relatively muted over the past year. That, combined with higher inflation, means Americans are earning less for an hour of work. Average hourly earnings, adjusted for inflation, fell 0.5 percent in September, and were down 0.7 percent from a year earlier. It was the sixth straight month of year-over-year declines in real earnings.
Where are they getting this data? This directly contradicts their claim:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/realer.nr0.htm
> Real average hourly earnings for all employees decreased 0.5 percent from August to September, seasonally adjusted, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today… From September 2025 to September 2026, real average hourly earnings decreased 0.7 percent, seasonally adjusted.
Your chart appears to be weekly earnings, not per-hour wages. Having to pick up more shifts or a second job to make ends meet supports the point, in my book.
Another factor in that case was that the government regulated, in some cases, the ratings of bonds that entities were allowed to buy (they couldn't be as highly levered with lower rated bonds) and so there was an incentive for bond ratings to be falsely inflated, happily carried out by the rating agencies. Of course collateralized junk is still junk, and many people at the time knew that, but there was money to be made in looking the other way.
The cause is always a failure of underwriting. That was true of the Savings and Loan Crisis, the Great Financial Crisis.
It feels like each bubble gets bigger.
> It feels like each bubble gets bigger.
Well you would expect that given that the market keeps getting bigger and the money in circulation keeps getting bigger.
Inflation alone means each bubble should be bigger than the last all other things being equal.
Adjusting for inflation, though, things also can happen faster now than, say, thirty years ago, and there's more centralization in quite a few industries.
> Adjusting for inflation, though, things also can happen faster now than, say, thirty years ago, and there's more centralization in quite a few industries.
Not sure its just related to centralization, probably more so that information can flow more freely now, but I fully agree.
And for this one when insurance companies are forming syndicates because their underwriting becomes greater than any one company, it just sounds frightening, the sound this thing is going to make when it finally pops.
I reacted the same. What could be a bad sign though is if they try to sell it and they dont get what they want.
yeah, either they discount it enough to look worthwhile to someone, or they keep it and take the risk. Risk assessments are inherently subjective, so both parties can think they're making a deal.
>We lent £1,000 to John Sozzleby at 10%. We quantify the risk level as “iffy”, which is 42.6 qualm points above "dodgy". and are willing to sell you the debt for £700. its a great deal!
This is what a lot of, if not all, IPOs are for too.
Lots of names to obfuscate the same financial yada yada.
|This is just what banks do O_o underwrite loans, then collateralize (i.e. bundle) to people who want the risk.
... and from the linked piece ...
| Banks do not sell down debt they are confident in
... I have no claim to expertise but both of these can't be true.
I wouldn't worry about it anyway, you can be sure when the day comes "they'll be to big to fail".
The next sentence in that article is:
> They sell down debt when they are worried about concentration, which is exactly what "approaching internal limits" means in plain English: too much of this bank's balance sheet is now one bet on one sector holding up.
Which is correct, but kind of weird because being confident in a credit and being worried about concentration are not really mutually exclusive things. You can be pretty confident in an investment but not want it to constitute a majority of your portfolio. (Bankers know that even very strong credits are never 100% guaranteed to pay out.)
Let's say I offered you the chance to pay $100 to get $120 back if at least one coin toss in five came up heads. That's a pretty good bet, right? But would you bet your house on it?
yes just like mortgage backed securities in 2007
Next thing you know, they're going to take the money in your savings account lend it out to anyone who asks for a loan!
/s
So, is this the type of signs we should be on the lookout anticipating an impending implosion?
I remember in Summer 2007 feeling that there was an impending implosion coming based on the shady practice of using 2nd mortgages as downpayments - it had become a common practice. Started doing a bit of shorting (not too much), made a little, lost a little and then sort of lost interest in doing it just about the time things fell apart in '08. All that to say that these things can take a lot longer than you'd expect. You can look at the situation (like the circular funding as well as this article) and decide that yes it's not sustainable. But it can sustain longer than you expect.
Oh, I am well aware it's hard to time it. But still getting a general sense of the impending crash can help preparing in different ways. You can park part of your assets, not completely withdraw. Or pay extra for piece of mind by hedging them. Sure, it will cost, maybe won't be needed at all, or still misfired, but I'll sleep better with less anxiety, so that's still a win in my book...
Yeah. The thing is, we were being told that was a problem in late 2004 (this is when Max Keiser was writing and talking about the risks to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; he and others saying this were written off as cranks, even though they laid out a pretty solid scenario that came substantially true.)
So yes, Oracle is likely a canary in the coal mine.
It can only really be seen as an indicator of hidden risks to the banks from exposure to the SPVs.
But how long it will take before the miners start dropping dead from the fumes, who knows. Could be years, could be a few weeks after the Anthropic IPO when people are sitting smoking on the steps to the helipad saying "what the fuck? No I mean, really, really. What the fuck!"
This is the thing about being right too early has the same effect of being wrong.
Which is why I hate when people criticize some obviously overvalued shit, and the response is "why don't you short it".
Sometimes the best way to be safe of something about to explode is to just get away from it.
Yep, market can remain irrational for longer than you can stay solvent.
With these things it's not about spotting the signs but rather predicting the timing. Everyone and their dog can see the signs but that's not enough to be actionable
If I knew the answer to that I’d go short some stock…and maybe not post about it.
The big two AI labs are still not listed on the stock market, and SPCX is still above it's listing price. Unless you can remain liquid more than the market remains irrational better find some other use for your investment funds. No?
Just short Oracle and Coreweave.
My chop block list has those, plus micron, amd, nvidia, sandisk, western digital, skhynix, corning and marvell.
Those should really eat a lot of shit if any of the two ai companies stops buying everything no matter the price.
Why Corning?
They make the fiber optic cables and such that connect everything.
Depends on what price the banks offload at.
When the debt in 2007 sucked, it crashed the economy. But when the price was good in 2006, everyone celebrated.
Note: prices are getting worse for bonds today but nothing panic worthy yet.
Not sure I agree. The credit default swaps have been extremely expensive lately, meaning that someone is already thinking about an AI bubble popping that will take private credit down which will make banks take a serious hit (11% of their outstanding loans are to linked to AI). On top of that we are in a time where the economy is propped up basically by AI spending and delinquencies on all sort of debt are at historically high rates.
I am panicking a bit TBH
oh ffs please
With bad dentists (1) and bad debt underwriters on the HN front page, I love that subjective diagnosis remains challenging and topical.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50050553
When are we getting CDOs with Nvidia GPUs as collateral as Nvidia envisions?
As soon as Jensen gets his new leather jacket and invests in the new neocloud who then buys up nvidia chips.
That's some very nice collateral you have there. But can it run crysis?
It can run a financial crysis
How much frames in CounterStrike,then? :-D
/s
Major base rate fallacy.
This is common. Selling debt is normal. If there is money to be made by selling the debt and going back to issuing more loans, they’ll try to find a buyer.
Everyone is so primed to believe that all things related to data centers are bad that they’ll assume this is a special event. The person writing the headline knows that.
It's normal to sell debt. It's not normal to underwrite bad debt.
Who is building the infrastructure to resell the gpus from failed data centers if / when this collapses. It would be a waste for everything to get wasted
Maybe as ship's ballast.
The GPUs used in data centers cant really be used outside the same context. They cant connect to standard PCs or servers. They are highly specialized. The resale would need to be at the server or rack level for the same use case.
Aren't they PCIe like everything else or am I missing something? I know they have some fast interconnects. If not, is an adapter to PCIe possible?
Cooling is usually what kills you with server gear at home. I don't have a cold aisle, or a case that flows that much air. Can I water cool it enough?
No video outputs would probably be my biggest annoyance. It should be fine at headlessly rendering games for streaming though, as well as AI.
If there's a will, there's usually a way.
Lots of the newer stuff is watercooled
Yes they use pcie electrically, but its not the same slot shape and there is usually carrier boards
You wouldn’t repurpose these for home gaming, it would still be for llms
would it be possible to sell this stuff to any of these "crypto" companies for mining or whatever tasks?
Indeed, also even the air cooled ones are designed for high static pressure fans (ie small fans that spin at really high RPMs). Those fans are really really loud.
You can just mod them to run on consumer fans that are designed to spin much slower but have higher diameter
Yes, they're "just" pcie, though units like H100 and newer (or did it start with pascal? i really don't know) have variants that use a proprietary connector called SXM, but it's always just pcie lanes underneath. In some versions there are interposer and mezzanine boards, but again, pcie with associated bits and bobs like retimers and pcie switches. Not impossible to integrate, just annoying.
So, sort of specialized? but not really.
> If there's a will, there's usually a way.
That's the spirit!
I bet China will find a way. They have stuff like desktop-size motherboards with BGA soldered mobile chips, just cause they can.
They already have PCI-e SXM risers and external multi-SXM boards for V100's.
I mean it's not that hard. It's just hard if your frame of reference is "can I download it within one click on my $6000 Macbook".
This whole subthread is just sad. "Oh no, it's not the same form factor. It is useless".
Where's the "Hacker" in "Hacker News" there.
It's a shame that we need to defer to "China" as a shorthand for "actual engineers" just because our own engineers lack imagination and drive that would validate being given that title in the first place.
> It's a shame that we need to defer to "China" as a shorthand for "actual engineers" just because our own engineers lack imagination and drive that would validate being given that title in the first place.
There are a lot of reasons other than skill why China is the way it is. Culture and locality are big ones. I don't know a whole lot but I disagree that any "actual engineer" could easily come up with a sustainable business for this stuff in the US -- for example, harvesting and processing used parts for their components is a hugely laborious process, and China has a huge culture of recycling and reworking that simply does not exist in the US (and would largely be socially unacceptable to introduce!). Take for example the pre-modded 4090s, or the BGA desktop motherboards I mentioned, or any number of other products that are based not merely on sheer engineering. It's not exactly engineering on its own that causes these things to happen, but more the fact that nearly anybody can just throw together an operation like that and have tons of workers available to make it sustainable.
I do believe that your assessment that it will come from China is right. Though, at least the "coming up with the idea" is something that could be done in the West I would argue. We too could read datasheets and probe stuff. We just chose not to.
Please don't misunderstand me as attacking you. I was attacking that other guy further up the thread with the empty GitHub account and the equally empty ambitions, trying to drag all of us crabs back into this bucket we find ourselves in.
> I do believe that your assessment that it will come from China is right. Though, at least the "coming up with the idea" is something that could be done in the West I would argue. We too could read datasheets and probe stuff. We just chose not to.
Oh, plenty of people do not choose not to -- there are tons of blog posts and YouTube videos out there of people doing stuff exactly like this! It's just the making it sustainable part that's very difficult outside of somewhere like China, because -- unless you have special VC privilege -- you can't really offer reasonable prices to the masses, which makes your purchase volume go down, which further drives up your prices even more, until it converges on some insane number.
I don't mind running private deepseek instances on server rack that I have bought for cents on the dollar.
Why not use them to host AI models? There is a ton of demand for AI that shadows consumer Pc usage. There is a compute shortage right now for AI.
There have been some examples of folks ripping off the SMX interface and rewiring the card for PCI-E but I'm not sure how efficient that would really be or what kind of market there could be
Here is an example of an SXM2 adapter board to use a regular pcie slot
https://ebay.io/m/imDgiL
I volunteer as tribute!
I'd much rather be in the recovery/asset remarketing market rather than the primary/reseller one when this thing pops, for sure.
Same thing they did with bad mortgages just before the 2008 crash.
The media will do anything to capitalize on public fear, seriously...
Yeah that's sort of how banks work.
"bank does what banks normally do" is not news
JOHN TULD: And Mr. Sullivan that challenge is?
PETER SULLIVAN: We have to hold these assets on our books longer than we might ideally like to.
JOHN TULD: Yes.
JOHN: So. Now that we know the music has stopped. What do we do about it?
JARED: Sell it all. Today.
JOHN: Is that even possible, Sam?
SAM: Yes. But at what cost?
This sounds like fearmongering. Banks aren't in the business of collecting on debt. They are in the business of writing loans they can sell to people who collect the debt. This is pretty standard business in the 2020s. Not defending data centers or AI or whatever, not denying that there is an AI bubble. Just saying that this is how business is done now.
I'll be damned if I don't get to throw people off roofs this time.
There's also a non-zero chance gubernatorial elections are won on the basis of pardoning such transgressions in the future.
Y/N
Is this our chance to 'get rich' by buying a negative valued asset? Like that time barrels were trading at 0$ or negatives?
They should offload the overprovisioned, hyper concentrated GPUs back to the people
Why? It's hard to see what they're good for outside of AI data center workloads. Your average member of the general public arguably doesn't have much use for a "graphics processing unit" that isn't actually capable of processing graphics
I run free local models on my A4500. I wouldn't mind a little upgrade... if I could afford it.
You sound exactly like the people who didn't understand personal computers because mainframes existed.
I don't see how. I'm not saying that consumer-grade hardware isn't useful because enterprise-grade hardware exists. I'm saying that enterprise-grade hardware isn't particularly practical for most consumers. Personal computers were many things, but what they generally weren't was people installing IBM S/390s in their living rooms. Because some of the same design features that make them great for centralized, high volume business workloads also makes them kind of a PITA if that isn't what you need.
For my part, I do work on machine learning projects at home. But I'm nowhere near operating at a scale where datacenter GPU features like being optimized for 4- and 8-bit calculations would be a net benefit. Nor do I have any particular desire to have one of those things making my home office sound like I live next to a steel mill.
It's not too far off from why I don't have a box truck parked in my garage even though it's technically more capable than my Kia. And on the occasions when that is what I need, the local hardware store will gladly rent one to me for $20 per day.
They're buying out RAM and consumer GPUs too.
Mainframes did not make and still don't make very good personal computers. Same goes for these "gpus". They are the modern day mainframes. (I know we still have mainframes, but that is besides analog)
What exactly is the average consumer supposed to do with an NVIDIA H100 or GB200?
They can have a pretty good LLM running in there, or cad design. For the average joe, having the free tier of AI without the breach of privacy is pretty good already.
For the average joe, spending $10k on the server-grade hardware needed to run the GPU, plus $100-$200 per month for power is not a great investment.
The hope is that a crash would lead to fire sale prices, and as for power, you may not need to run your system 24x7 depending on your use case.
Sorry if this appears obtuse, but what exactly is an “AI Data Center”?
Is it a data center with nothing but GPUs, that does nothing but inference all day and all night?
Is it a data center custom-built for only AI companies to use?
Do these “AI Data Centers” have data storage? VPS? …
Or, as I suspect, is “AI Data Center” simply a fake media buzzword that really means “Normal Data Centers” but with political baggage and stigma built-in.
> Or, as I suspect, is “AI Data Center” simply a fake media buzzword that really means “Normal Data Centers” but with political baggage and stigma built-in.
No you're absolutely right. The only difference that I can tell is power requirements are legitimately higher because GPUs consume more electricity. More cooling is also needed because there's more heat generated. Aside from those two things, it's a plain old datacenter that companies have been building at break neck speeds since like 1996. Now that I think about it, how come there's no panic about additional Internet backbone capacity needed to support these "AI datacenters"?
It's a data centre being build specifically to run LLMs (and possibly other ML models). As such, it will be focused on NVIDIA servers with large numbers of inter-connected GPUs (so they can run the 2T-4T parameter models from OpenAI, Anthropic, etc.) [1].
It's a different build-out to a data centre that can host video/YouTube content (fast CPU, no GPU, large number/size of hard drives), or that can run web servers (fast CPUs, low to average hard drive capacity).
[1] https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/
If the next token prediction machine doesnt live up to the hype, this is going to be one massive bubble.
The next token prediction machine is writing 90%+ code at multi-trillion $$$ companies, its already solved millennial problems -- but yes its definitely not living up to hype.
But it's creating new problems, and when the damage those new problems outweighs the value created, then that's when the bubble starts (or started) to form and we live in a delusion until the damage massively outweigh the benefits, is when the bubble popping starts being considered, and then when there's irreversible damage is when the bubble popping is marked for formal revision and then when ...
This tracks with recent reporting that AI debt issuance fell 50% month over month in September[0]
> Tech companies raised $23 billion in AI-related debt globally in September, less than half the amount raised in August, according to Morgan Stanley data covering public bonds and private placement transactions.
> The decline marks a continued drop from June, when companies raised a record $113 billion for AI infrastructure including data centers and chips. In the US investment-grade market, where blue-chip tech groups borrowed around $306 billion between January and August, AI-related bond issuance stopped completely last month.
0: https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/tech-compan...
To make senes of the drop we need to know how much they expected to raise in September. Were the expecting to raise $50B but only raised $23B? Or were they expecting to raise $25B but only raised $23B? That's an important detail. Further, "bond issuance stopped"... was that intentional or not? It's like we're getting half the story and then have to use our imagination and biases to make the story as bad as possible.
ftfa "Morgan Stanley attributed the decline to the large amount of debt already raised earlier this year."
ok, is that good or bad? They never say.
Oracle data enter debt.
'nuff said.
This is completely normal. Banks underwrite large loans and then package a bunch of them in different ways to sell to different investors.
slop
The CDSs on some loans are getting to the point where it’s too expensive to even bet that the loans will fail as the CDS market seems to have concluded the loans will fail.
> The CDOs on some loans are getting to the point where it’s too expensive to even bet that the loans will fail as the CDO market seems to have concluded the loans will fail.
Did you mean CDS? As your sentence doens't make sense as its written.