I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
I wouldn’t say that, but it’s honest. And I’ll read the write up and reserve judgement until I’m done or decide it’s not worth continuing. When AI writes the article and there’s a disclaimer, I won’t read it. Saw one the other day: I used ai to write this, if you have a problem with that, stop reading. Of course, I did stop reading (and flagged the post).
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
Chromium used static IDs for web accessible resources until very recently, and even now it's only optional for extensions to use dynamic IDs. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs it, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
Wonder what the over-under is on a page exploiting your `block-element` interface if you happen to open it (I guess you could sort of encourage that interaction) vs explicitly getting served malware eg "Discover-Tech’s Controlium".
For those checking (I still had the vulnerable version), you should be at these versions or higher:
uBlock Origin: 1.76.4
uBO Lite: 2026.1110.1816
After the update, I still have 1.76.2 on the firefox dev edition on mac.
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
UXP: https://repo.palemoon.org/MoonchildProductions/UXP
Pale Moon: https://www.palemoon.org/
Basilisk: https://www.basilisk-browser.org/faq.html
SeaMonkey: https://www.seamonkey-project.org/
Really love the "I wrote all the prose, gpt wrote the POC" disclaimer, I would love to see more of those kinds of signals on human authored content.
Instant vote of confidence, yes!
I wouldn’t say that, but it’s honest. And I’ll read the write up and reserve judgement until I’m done or decide it’s not worth continuing. When AI writes the article and there’s a disclaimer, I won’t read it. Saw one the other day: I used ai to write this, if you have a problem with that, stop reading. Of course, I did stop reading (and flagged the post).
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
So this seems totally solvable by the create-rule element living in the browser chrome instead of the website DOM... why aren't we doing that?
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
That is... an ironic disaster.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50454639
Chromium used static IDs for web accessible resources until very recently, and even now it's only optional for extensions to use dynamic IDs. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs it, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
Good day to use EWW
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
Wonder what the over-under is on a page exploiting your `block-element` interface if you happen to open it (I guess you could sort of encourage that interaction) vs explicitly getting served malware eg "Discover-Tech’s Controlium".
Software professionals should uninstall a javascript plugin that runs on every website whose purpose is to consume content more comfortably.
It’s not about comfort. It’s basic security at this point. 2026 web ads are cancer.
Manifest V3 wins again
> a similar but less problematic issue also affected the MV3 version, uBO Lite
Manifest v3 is the adblock and sanitization equivalent of encasing your computer in cement and then declaring it secure.
> encasing your computer in cement
mafia execution?